The permanently tense Uzbek-Tajik
relations sank to a new low in November 2011 – January 2012. Clearly
being in the position of strength vis-a-vis its fairly poor neighbor,
Uzbekistan makes use of its advantageous geographic location to exert
pressure on Tajikistan, provoking serious socioeconomic problems in the
republic.
Rail traffic stoppages resulting in delays of cargo supplies to
Tajikistan began in Uzbekistan in November, 2009. In January, 2010, the
Uzbek railroad company disallowed under various pretexts the passage of
around 150 railcars bound for Tajikistan, and by February the number
rose to 400. Tajik premier's conversation with his Uzbek counterpart
Shavkat Mirziyoyev helped clear the way for 178 of the railcars stuck in
Uzbekistan, but the overall situation with the transit between the two
Central Asian republics remained essentially the same. According to
Tajik officials, around 2,000 railcars carrying freight to Tajikistan
were delayed by the Uzbek authorities since June, 2010. No railcars
heading for Tajikistan's southern Khatlon province got the greenlight in
early March – early May, and the total volume of freight transit via
the Tajik railroad dropped by 40% over the first half of 2010. In
Tajikistan, the fuel shortages which ensued put in jeopardy the sowing
campaign, exposing to a critical risk the republic with a predominantly
agrarian economy.
There is firm belief in Dushanbe that the rail blockade imposed by
Tashkent on Tajikistan came as a response to the intensification of
construction of the Rogun Dam. In 2009, the Tajik administration
conducted a campaign of offering to the population the Rogun
hydroelectric project shares and managed to launch the dam rebuilding
process. Uzbekistan reacted by delaying freight en route to Tajikistan
in an attempt to impede the Rogun construction. At the moment,
Uzbekistan seems to regard the Rogun project as the key threat to its
national security as the dam has a potential to reduce the availability
of water resources downstream the Amu Darya. Considering that 75% of the
population of Uzbekistan are rural dwellers and are employed in
agriculture or adjacent sectors of the economy, a decrease in water
supply for agricultural needs may have an extremely negative impact on
the republic. Tajikistan completed the preparatory phase at Rogun in
2010 and announced that technically everything was in place to block the
flow of the Vakhsh, a tributary of the Amu Darya. The corresponding
decision to be taken by a Tajik governmental commission was put on hold
pending the finalization of the World Bank's Rogun assessment study. It
is indeed likely that the intensification of the Rogun hydropower plant
construction is the explanation behind the new round of tensions between
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which, even apart from the issue, have been
locked in bitter disputes for years.
The conflict between the two republics saw escalation in November, 2011
following a blast at the Galaba-Amu Zang stretch of the
Termez-Qurghonteppa railroad in southern Uzbekistan, not far from the
Tajik and Afghan borders. The incident was promptly described as a
terrorist attack by the Uzbek media and Uzbekistan suspended the
Galaba-Amu Zang traffic in its wake, effectively subjecting Tajikistan's
southern Khatlon province to a transit blockade. By the end of
November, the number of railcars which were bound for Khatlon but got
stuck in Uzbekistan reached 270. The Uzbek railroad company suggested
redirecting them to Dushanbe, from where they could proceed to
Tajikistan's south, but Tajikistan rejected the plan as excessively
costly. In the process, Tajik experts actually contested the version by
which the blast had been a terrorist act and expressed a view that,
citing the incident, Tashkent seized the opportunity to put Dushanbe
under pressure. Tajik railroad deputy-chief Vladimir Sobkalov said
Uzbekistan's railroad company could easily restore the bridge damaged by
the blast within 24 hours and stressed that Uzbekistan brushed off the
Tajik offer of help in doing so.
The round of tensions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan affected the
whole Central Asian transit network. With a reference to freight delays
in Uzbekistan, the Kazakh railroad company temporarily banned the
transit of freight to Afghanistan via Tajikistan and the supply of all
types of cargo other than grain to Uzbekistan from November 3 till
December 12. Following a request from the Turkmen railroad officials,
the loading of all freight with the exception of grain and flour for
subsequent delivery to Afghanistan via Serhetabat was suspended for the
same period of time. Kazakh railroad CEO K. Almagambetov said as a
comment on the step that the ban was due to the Uzbek railroad
administration's failure to handle the freight carried via the Saryagash
railroad link where 20 trains had been delayed. The developments took
place in the season when the majority of Central Asians stockpile food
supplies for the coming winter, and the termination of supplies from
Kazakhstan immediately told on the adjacent republics' consumer
markets.
Head of the UN's World Food Program (WFP) office in Tajikistan Alzira
Ferreira warned on December 13 that Tajikistan's population may face
food shortages as a result of the Uzbek blockade. She told that even
trains carrying humanitarian aid were unable to make it to Tajikistan,
and the number of trains with foodstuffs intercepted by Uzbekistan
reached 23. The UN provides food aid to around 500,000 residents of the
Khatlon province and to the region's 2,000 schools. According to
Ferreira, the delays caused the food prices in Tajikistan to grow and
were leaving increasing numbers of people in the republic without
subsistence.
On January 18, Tajik railroad deputy-chief Vladimir Sobkalov charged
that Uzbekistan's blocking railroad traffic to Khatlon was politically
motivated. Tajik railroad official Usmon Kalandarov said the Uzbek
authorities indicated that the damaged bridge would be rebuilt only when
they are through with the investigation into the blast. He quoted the
Uzbek side as saying that the bridge pillars had to be repaired but
contended that the pillars were actually intact. By the time 298
railcars with freight for South Tajikistan, including 72 with flour, 26
with wheat, 25 with concrete, 26 with gasoline, 8 with jet fuel, 8 with
gas, 3 with diesel fuel, and 56 with other types of cargo – were bogged
down at the border between the republics.
The border situation further overheated due to the November 13 incident
involving the death of an Uzbek borderguard. The Tajik story is that
the Uzbek borderguards invaded Tajikistan while trailing smugglers who
were illicitly carrying a shipment of electronic appliances, but the
Uzbek officials maintain that the smugglers were drug traffickers
eventually caught with 3.8 kg of heroin. Uzbekistan deployed
considerable forces – tanks and artillery – in the proximity of the
Tajik border in the aftermath, triggering an outbreak of panic in
Tajikistan's border-area Sughd Province. Tashkent unexpectedly shut down
9 of the existing 16 checkpoints on the Uzbek-Tajik border in
mid-January on the grounds that the facilities awaited renovation, while
deputy head of the Tajik Customs Service Negmat Rakhmatov made it clear
that Tajikistan received closure notifications concerning only some of
the checkpoints and several went offline unnanouncedly. It is also worth
noting in the context that since 2000 travel between Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan is subject to visa requirements and that the transit between
the two republics via expressways or by air is completely missing.
As of today, the relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are far
more unfriendly than those between any other pair of Central Asian
republics. It may be an accomplished fact that the visa regime is no
longer unusual for the region, but the transit blockade and recurrent
fatal border-zone clashes clearly make the Uzbek-Tajik conflict the
worst in Central Asia. Curiously, in the meantime Tashkent's and
Dushanbe's foreign-policy priorities are fairly similar as both recently
took to cultivating ties with Washington and - to counter the Russian
influence – increasingly favor the US entrenchment. WikiLeaks
revelations showed that Washington sees the current Tajik diplomacy
chief and number one pro-Western politician Hamrokhon Zarifi as the
future leader of Tajikistan, but there are no reasons to hope that his
likely presidency would help defuse the Uzbek-Tajik conflict.
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