Introductory Observations
The Middle East right from the 1990s had
figured significantly in the strategic focus
of United States strategic planning,
deployment and security architecture. In the
last two decades, the United States has
fought two major wars in the region. Gulf
War I IN 1991 and Gulf War II fought in 2003
basically revolved around the subjugation of
Iraq to pre-empt its emergence as the
dominant regional power, its nuclear weapons
potential and thereby posing a security
threat to United States regional interest
and to the security of Israel. In the second decade of the 21st
Century the United States is beset with a
repeat strategic dilemma of pre-empting the
emergence of yet another regional power in
the shape of Iran, its advanced nuclear
weapons capabilities and its more potent
security threats to the United States and
Israel.
The Middle East strategic landscape in 2012
stands drastically changed with traditional
US allies in the Middle East embarking on
different trajectories of “hedging
strategies”, unsure of United States
strategic blueprint in the region and a
strategic perception weighing that United
States power was on the decline.
In 2012 the drumbeats of war to strike at
Iran’s nuclear enrichment complexes are
becoming more strident within the United
States and Israel. Positions are hardening
with US imposing additional economic
sanctions against Iran and Iran on the
rebound threatening that it would blockade
the strategic choke-point of Hormuz Straits.
In such a surcharged strategic environment
in the Middle East the United States
“strategic pivot” away from the Middle East
to Asia Pacific as given out in US Defence
Strategic Review 2012 needs to be examined
contextually in terms of its strategic
impact on the Middle East region.
This is being examined under the following
heads:
-
The Middle East Regional Balance of Power in 2012
-
US Defence Strategic Review 2012 Formulations on the Middle East.
-
Middle East Regional Perceptions on US Defence Strategic Review 2012 Strategic Postures
-
United States Strategic Options in Middle East in 2012
The Middle East Regional Balance of Power in
2012
Excluding the United States as an external
balancing power the Middle East regional
balance of power is heavily weighted in
favour of Iran.
Iran has a sizeable military machine with
unmatched conventional and missiles arsenal.
To that if added the evolving nuclear
weapons capabilities, Iran emerges as the
predominant regional power. Iran’s highly
religiously committed military manpower is a
comparative ‘force multiplier’.
Turkey, while a power of consequence can no
longer be counted as a United States
strategic asset despite continuing as a NATO
Alliance member, as it is engaged on
independent postures trajectory, not
entirely supportive of US strategic
interests in the region.
United States traditional Allies comprising
the monarchical oil-rich kingdoms of Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms are no
military match for Iran, despite their
advance military hardware. They are
constrained by limited manpower population
and the restive Shia populations in their
midst where in countries like Bahrain, they
are in a majority.
Israel is the only Middle East nation which
in 2012 can be rated as the only substantial
military ally of the United States and with
a nuclear weapons arsenal at its disposal.
United States continues to be the
pre=eminent military power in the Middle
East for two major reasons: (1) With its
global power projection capabilities and
military superiority it can speedily induct
major military force levels in the Middle
East in crisis situations. (2) Russia and
China can still no longer provide
countervailing power against the United
States in the Middle East even though
strategically they side with Iran and Syria,
both these two nations in United States
strategic cross-hairs.
In terms of regional military balance of
power in the Middle East in 2012, the so
called ‘The Iran Threat’ can only be
balanced by strategic duo of United States
and Israel as a ‘Two Alone Coalition’. It is
unlikely that countries like Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and Egypt would stand tall to be
counted in any United States-Iran military
confrontation.
US Defence Strategic Review 2012
Formulations on the Middle East
The US Strategic Review postulates that the
Middle East will witness “US placing premium
on maintaining its military presence and
capabilities in broader Middle East”.
Implicit in this postulation is the
strategic reality that in terms of strategic
priorities prompted by China’s rise in the
Asia Pacific and the US budgetary pressures,
the Middle East would now be in a lower
pecking order of US strategic priorities.
This however should not get translated into
a reading that United States has adopted a
“Hands Off the Middle East” strategic
blueprint. US Defence Secretary presumably
reacting to such concerns asserted that
following the US military withdrawal from
Iraq recently, the United States still has
40,000 troops in the region including 23,000
in Kuwait.
The United States also maintains the US
Fifth Fleet within The Gulf, headquartered
in Bahrain with one or two US Navy Aircraft
Carriers Battle Groups on cruise in The Gulf
besides hosts of submarines, combat ships,
logistic ships and an amphibious warfare
capability.
In 2012, it appears that the United States
has strategically concluded that the
immediate ‘threat concerns’ of the United
States in the Middle East are focussed on
military adventurism by Iran e.g. blockade
of Hormuz Straits and any military
turbulence breaking out in Iraq following
the US military withdrawal from that country
For these two military contingencies, the
United States seemingly concludes that
‘in-location’ basing of force-levels
mentioned above would be an adequate nucleus
to be built upon when military contingency
so dictate.
Middle East Regional Perceptions on US
Defence Strategic Review 2012 Strategic
Postures
Middle East regional perceptions seem to be
drawing comparisons with the British
withdrawal in the late 1960s as part of its
‘East of Aden Withdrawal Strategy’.
Inescapably intertwined in such Middle East
regional perceptions are two other
conclusions, namely, that United States has
economically declined and that consequently
there is a decline in US global and regional
power capabilities. The net result being
perceived is that of the Middle East region
sliding strategically in US strategic
priorities.
In terms of regional perceptions, what
inevitably would also be figuring is that
the United States, on lesser or no
substantial evidence resorted to military
intervention against Iraq on two occasions
on its nuclear weapons potential, whereas in
the case of Iran on far more substantive
evidence, the United States has so far been
reluctant to militarily strike at Iranian
nuclear enrichment complexes.
Psychologically, the above two regional
perceptions would be creating a traumatic
effect on the Middle East oil-rich kingdoms
long used to substantial US military
deployments in the Middle East and ensuring
regional stability and security.
The ‘hedging strategies,’ of countries led
by Saudi Arabia to strategically reach out
to Russia and China expecting them to act as
restraining influence on Iran has not
brought any dividends. Iran continues to be
backed by Russia and China,
Perceptively therefore, Saudi Arabia, UAE
etc. would have no option other than to
revert to an unquestioned reliance on the
United States as guarantor of their
security. The United States however this
time around would call upon these Middle
East monarchies to reorganize, integrate and
fine-tune their own military set-ups to face
the threats that stand posed to them.
Such a development should be a strategic
gain for the United States as it ‘pivots’ to
the Asia Pacific.
United States Strategic Options in the
Middle East 2012
In reviewing the strategic options open to
the United States in 2012 the following
factors have to be accepted as ‘givens’:
-
United States strategic blueprint perforce will be framed by the formulations in US Defence Strategic Review 2012.
-
Middle East strategic landscape in terms of US-Iran confrontational postures is not likely to ease for quite some time.
-
In the absence of any other countervailing powers available as strategic choices to Middle East nations, perforce they have to rely on the United States as guarantor of their security and stability.
The United States strategic aims in the
Middle East remain unchanged from what was
hithertofore, namely:
-
Israel’s security and stability as a critical ally in the Middle East.
-
Pre-empt the rise of any regional predominant power, which in 2012 threat perceptions of USA is Iran.
-
Prevent Iran’s nuclear weapons arsenal becoming a military reality.
-
Unfettered global access to Middle East energy sources and the sea-lanes on which global energy imports traverse.
Can the United States achieve its strategic
aims in the Middle East with the
formulations postulated in Defence Strategic
Review 2012? Obviously the strategic
planning establishment of the United States
would have taken all the above factors into
account when deciding their blueprint for
the21st Century.
The examination of the options open to the
United States in 2012 can best be done for
focusing on the following:
-
The Iran Threat
-
Security Architecture in The Gulf and Possible US Initiatives Post-Iraq Withdrawal
-
United States Own Military Blueprint
Iran for years now has been preparing for a
US and Western Forces military intervention.
It therefore can be assumed that Iran can
make the costs of US military intervention
prohibitive. One week’s blockade of Hormuz
Straits by Iran can generate Global Economic
Depression.
United States on its own may not be inclined
for a military showdown with Iran. US
military strikes against Iran are being
advocated and stoked by Israel and more
pointedly by Saudi Arabia. Even limited air
strikes by the United States and its allies
on nuclear installations of Iran will force
eruption of widespread violence by Shia
majorities in Gulf countries’
Any US military option against Iran should
therefore be off the table as the backlash
against the US and its allies will acquire
religious overtones and will not be confined
to Middle East only but erupt worldwide.
This in turn would strategically distract
the United States from its ‘pivot’ to Asia
Pacific and making its military postures in
the Asia Pacific credible to face The China
Threat.
Moving to the existing security architecture
in The Gulf, it is negligible, as the
oil-rich monarchies were complacent with
substantive US Forces located in Iraq, not
only to control Iraq but also to checkmate
Iran. Here one cannot forget that Saudi
Arabia and Turkey did not permit the United
States to use military bases in their
territory which housed US Air Force assets
as part of security commitments for
operations against Iraq in 2003.
Saudi Arabia ironically having so refused
the United States and further after 9/11
adopting ‘hedging strategies’ against the
United States, would now in 2012 be forced
to rely on the United States to cope with
The Iran Threat.
The United States needs to prevail heavily
on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies to
add more teeth to the security dimensions of
the Gulf Cooperation Council. In accordance
with the main thrust of the US Defence
Strategic Review 2012 the United States
should confine itself to “Offshore
Balancing”.
The US Military Blueprint unfolding in 2012
following the Iraq withdrawal suggests that
the United States would maintain an overall
US military of 40,000 troops presence
primarily in the Gulf Region including
23,000 in Kuwait. The latter will take care
of any possible Iraqi turbulence and the
Iranian Threat.
The US Fifth Fleet headquartered in Bahrain
can be expected to be further augmented in
terms of Aircraft Carriers and battle ships.
US Marines Expeditionary Groups are also
forward located.
The United States is likely to proceed with
enhanced deployments of ballistic missiles
defense deployments, surveillance and
electronic assets to offset troops
withdrawal. However one thing is sure and
that is that the United States would deploy
enhanced military assets in Israel and not
in Arab countries which stand plagued by
domestic unrest.
The United States is well placed in terms of
sizeable US Navy and US Air Force deployed
in the Indian Ocean and Eastern
Mediterranean for operational use in the
Middle East and The Gulf. It should also not
be forgotten that the United States has
fought two major wars in the last two
decades in the region and has therefore
adequate combat experience for effective
military operations in the region.
Overall, it can be stated that US options in
the Middle East catering to The Iran Threat
are presently military in nature whose
dimensions have been outlined above. It is a
military posture on which the United States
can speedily build upon if open hostilities
emerge between the US and Iran.
This may itself prompt the United States to
explore more political avenues to defuse the
existing explosive situation in the Middle
East.
Concluding Observations
Undoubtedly, United States military presence
and options in the Middle East appear to
have been scaled down consequent to the
formulation of US Defense Strategic Review
2012 of the United States priority in its
‘pivot’ to the Asia Pacific.
United States military contingency plans for
this region expectedly would cater for
troops buildup at short notice from the
European Theater.
Despite this the conclusion cannot be
escaped in that in the Middle East there is
a growing perception that the United States
power is on the decline as it is no longer
capable of fighting and winning two major
wars at the same time.
The United States ‘pivot to Asia Pacific and
the absence of substantial US military
presence in the Middle East in 2012
perceptively does create a gap which others
will try to fill and start a new power game
observed so in The Business Recorder,
February 01 2012 which states:
“With Russia sending
warships to discourage foreign military
Intervention in Syria and China drawn more deeply into Iran’s
confrontation with the West, ‘great power politics ‘are swiftly
returning to Middle East”
Intervention in Syria and China drawn more deeply into Iran’s
confrontation with the West, ‘great power politics ‘are swiftly
returning to Middle East”
No comments:
Post a Comment