From: IISS
Allegations in March by both Syria's Assad regime and its opponents that the other side had used chemical weapons (CW) in the country's increasingly bitter civil war have served to highlight the challenges surrounding their prohibition. These will be on the agenda at the 2013 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conference, set to take place in The Hague on 8–19 April. The conference is intended to take stock of the implementation of the ban on chemical weapons (enshrined by the 1993 CWC), noting that the destruction of stockpiles is continuing and examining new areas of activity for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the implementation of the CWC. The crisis in Syria and the escalating threats emanating from North Korea, which also has CW stockpiles, have underlined the importance of such efforts. States party to the convention will examine deadlines for stockpile destruction, identify areas of priority and overcome challenges from CW-states that remain outside the convention.
CW use in Syria?
On 19 March, the Syrian state news agency (SANA) reported rocket attacks on government-held parts of Aleppo and in the suburbs of Damascus. They claimed 'terrorists' (as the opposition is characterised) had carried out the attacks. According to the Assad government, the attacks left victims short of breath and foaming at the mouth. They caused 25 deaths and wounded 86 people. The Russian foreign ministry rapidly confirmed the allegations, stating that 'a case of the use of chemical weapons by the armed opposition was recorded early in the morning of March 19 in Aleppo province'. But no evidence was put forward to support the claims.
The Syrian opposition was quick to deny its involvement in the attacks, but corroborated the reports and asserted that the government was in fact responsible for them. It stated that victims did indeed have difficulty breathing, and that they also had bluish skin after being exposed to chemicals. Although both sides provided 'proof' – photos and videos of victims in hospitals – none of it showed the site of the attack, and none of the victims pictured showed any clear signs of having suffered chemical poisoning (such as burnt skin).
A week later, reports emerged that the agent dispersed was chlorine (CL17). Chlorine is readily available and has large-scale commercial and industrial applications, for example as a disinfectant in swimming pools. Although chlorine was used as a chemical warfare agent during the First World War, the enormous quantities needed to cause mass casualties and its properties as an irritant rather than a lethal agent have rendered it relatively useless as a weapon of war. Chlorine is unlikely to have caused the 25 reported deaths. According to CW expert Jean-Pascal Zanders, 'we all know the effects if the dosage (of chlorine) in a swimming pool goes wrong and people get hospitalised, but rare are the instances when somebody dies'. Reports claimed that rockets were used in the attack, but explosions would destroy most of the agent, again reducing its impact. A strike on a chemical storage facility also seems unlikely. There were no reports of burning buildings and this would still not explain the 25 fatalities.
Why is Syria a concern?Syria has the largest CW arsenal in the Middle East and likely the fourth-largest in the world (after the United States, Russia and North Korea). Its exact size is unknown, but it has been assessed that Syria has developed and stockpiled hundreds of tonnes of chemical weapons.
Syria is known to have developed mustard gas, a blistering agent, and sarin, a nerve agent. It has also allegedly developed VX, a more powerful nerve agent, which lingers longer in the environment thereby increasing exposure rates, as well as cyanide gas. Chlorine is not thought to have figured in its arsenal, and would make little sense given its ineffectiveness as a chemical warfare agent. Its chemical agents have been weaponised into artillery shells, bombs and missiles, such as the Scud-B and -C missiles it acquired from North Korea from the 1990s onwards.
Concerns about Syria's CW stockpiles are growing as its two-year long crisis goes on. The proximity of some of its CW facilities to areas of conflict, along with the Assad regime's loss of territory, has raised fears that the regime may struggle to maintain control over its stockpiles in the event of attacks by rebel groups or even defections by guards. Tracking any loose materials would be extremely difficult in such a volatile context. Crucially, because Syria is not party to the CWC it is not subject to verification, meaning that little is known about the exact amounts of agents it possesses or where and how they are stored.
The status of the CWC and the 2013 Review Conference
The crisis in Syria clearly demonstrates the importance of the CWC and the risks of complacency. Signed in 1993, the convention expanded on the 1925 prohibition to use chemical weapons in war and prohibits states party to 'develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone'. To date, the convention counts 188 states party, and covers the majority of the world's chemical-industrial capabilities. Although by no means universal, the convention has, and continues to achieve, impressive support.
According to the OPCW, by early 2013, almost 80% of the world's stockpiles of chemical weapons had effectively been destroyed. Three countries party to the convention – Albania, India and South Korea – have destroyed their entire stockpiles. But Libya, the US and Russia have yet to complete the full destruction of their chemical weapons, which was meant originally to have been done ten years after accession to the treaty, and then by an extended deadline of 29 April 2012. The US and Russia, the two largest CW states, have destroyed approximately 90% and 70% of their respective declared stockpiles.
In Libya, the discovery of additional stockpiles and the chaos during the overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi's regime in 2011 led to a temporary halt in its stockpile destruction and an extension of its final deadline. In the US and Russia, delays in the construction of destruction facilities were partly responsible for their inability to meet the April 2012 deadline, but according to the OPCW, this was 'unrelated to the commitment of these States Parties'.
But despite these setbacks,the implementation of the convention seems to be largely on track. This positive outcome has led to questions over the future role of the OPCW, whose budget was largely allocated to the verification of declared stockpiles and former production facilities, and their respective destruction and conversion.
As progress continues to be made in the destruction of remaining stockpiles, the OPCW's role will be reoriented towards ensuring that 'the menace of chemical warfare and the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes will never reappear, and that international cooperation and assistance in the field of peaceful uses of chemistry can flourish'. The OPCW will focus on preventing the re-emergence of CW in an increasingly globalised chemical-industrial sector.
The CWC enshrines the rights of states party to legitimate international trade in, and the technological development of, their chemical industries, but also fosters cooperation in the development of these industries. These provisions are intended to attract states to join the convention. But certain members of the Non-Aligned Movement believe that their interests have been disregarded through the expansion of 'discriminatory' export controls that curtail legitimate activities. Following years of politicised debates on legitimate trade in chemicals, in 2011 new priorities were identified that would address this concern, including national capacity-building in areas not prohibited by the CWC and fostering stakeholder networks. Linked to the right to conduct peaceful activities is a further right to engage in preventive and protective activities, meaning that states party to the CWC are permitted to develop defences against the use of CW or accidents. The dual-use nature of CW and defensive industries has made verification of intentions rather challenging.
Concerns about scientific and technological advances related to CW underpin the challenges identified above. There is a fine line between encouraging progress and preventing risks. Although the general wording of the prohibition covers technological developments, some states party contend that only the substances specifically listed in the CWC annex schedules are prohibited. The CWC in fact prohibits all use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes. This covers toxic chemicals that are not considered chemical weapons but are used as such, for example the excessive use of tear gas.
The OPCW has sought to address scientific and technological advances by establishing a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) tasked with keeping an eye on such advances and their significance for the convention. Following the last review conference, the SAB noted that there was a 'shift of chemical production towards what are known as non-traditional chemical-producing countries' and that future technological convergence, for example in the overlap of chemistry and biology, needed to be planned for. During the forthcoming review conference, the process of keeping abreast of these developments will come under review and future trends will be identified.
New areas of concern such as terrorism, and chemical safety and security, have also been identified. As an international convention, the CWC only binds state actors. It makes no mention of chemical terrorism, which would by definition be conducted by non-state actors. This has made some countries unwilling to address the issue. But the conflict in Syria and the possibility that Assad may lose control over some of his CW stockpiles or deliberately pass them on to non-state actors such as Hizbullah, should help overcome this reticence. Given the divergent views on the issue, it is likely that the discussion of terrorism will happen incrementally as states begin to examine a new orientation for the convention and the OPCW.
Looking ahead
Regardless of the outcome of the 2013 review conference, it must be noted that with the destruction of almost 80% of the world's stockpiles already completed, the international community is well and truly on the path to a world free of chemical weapons. But there remain eight countries not party to the CWC, including Syria and North Korea.
Delegates in The Hague will have the task of taking stock of the implementation of the CWC, but also setting the agenda for the next few years. Countries will have to strike a balance between the CWC's traditional goals and mandate, and some of the new issues that have arisen. If there is no final document, the impact would be limited. After all, the principles of prohibition under the CWC are clear and well accepted, and the legal and political obligations remain constant for states party regardless of the outcome of the conference. But it is expected that in the end, states party will overcome their differences in order to produce a final communiqué, which will set a road map for a reorientation of the work of the OPCW and begin to address new threats.
No comments:
Post a Comment