The Asia-Pacific will comprise
26 percent — nearly $200 billion — of global naval and maritime security builds
in the next 20 years as complex relationships and rivalries drive procurements
designed for particular regional challenges. New builds in Asia and Australia include six aircraft carriers, 128
amphibious and 21 auxiliary ships, 12 corvettes, two cruisers, 42 destroyers,
235 fast attack craft, 115 frigates, 34 mine countermeasures, 82 offshore
patrol vessels (OPVs), 255 patrol craft and 116 submarines, said Bob Nugent,
vice president of advisory services at AMI International, a naval analysis firm
based in Bremerton, Wash. This list includes China
with 172 hulls, South Korea
at 145 and Japan
at 74, he said. The OPV market in particular is maturing, with a total regional market
forecast for 2013-2030 of $4.6 billion.
Trends indicate OPVs are not displacing frigates in fleet mix, but OPVs
do meet growing demand for “other-than-war” ship designs for maritime security
and law enforcement, Nugent said. This makes OPVs more likely to be ships first
on the scene at potential flashpoints. The relative simplicity and appeal of
OPVs allow local shipyards to take a larger role in designing and building
them.
Premium OPVs, at 1,500 tons and up, can successfully substitute for
corvettes and frigates for most requirements, Nugent said.
However, OPVs appear to be favored among members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), who are “more at the lower end with corvettes,
light frigates and OPVs, while in northeast Asia, it’s larger vessels,
including Aegis destroyers and large amphibious vessels, the latter vessels in
particular seem more in response to bilateral issues” beyond perceptions of
China’s military modernization, said Sam Bateman, a senior research fellow in
the Maritime Security Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. “After all, who is
going to invade China ?”
Concerns over China have shaped some Japanese and South Korean
submarine programs, and Aegis and large amphibious ship programs but, “initial
program decisions for those platforms predated the rise in the China Navy as
primary threat driver — they had/have Russia ,
in Japan ’s case, and North Korea
planning scenarios as drivers for ship design and numbers,” Nugent said.
The fact that all surface ships are vulnerable to air attack and are
well within the range of land-based fighter bases is largely ignored, Bateman
said.
“This is a consideration that should mitigate against putting a lot of
money into surface warships,” but when “regional naval procurements are being
discussed,” this issue “surprisingly” is not given much attention, he said.
While Washington analysts view Asia’s
naval and maritime buying spree as the result of Chinese belligerence in the
East China and South China Seas ,
Bateman said, some countries, including Japan ,
the Philippines and Vietnam , see a
more complex scenario.
“Other factors include longer-term force modernization aspirations,
regardless of China , the
greater availability of resources with growing economies, energy insecurities
and lingering bilateral concerns between neighboring countries,” apart from any
perceived threat from China ,
Bateman said.
“There is also a ‘demonstration effect’ associated with the increased
level of naval activity in the region ... as well as a ‘supply side’ push from
the major arms producing countries,” Bateman said.
Japan : Ensuring Access
For Japan , sea-lane
defense is coming to the fore in its steady naval buildup, along with deterring
future Chinese threats against Japan ’s
Nansei Islands ,
which stretch from the southern island
of Kyushu almost to neighboring Taiwan .
In explaining Japan ’s
defense needs for this year’s budget, which runs from April 1, 2013 to March 2014,
the Ministry of Defense has put defending the Nansei
Islands and deterring Japan ’s
territorial waters as top priorities.
“Japan
is a maritime nation that depends on access to the sea for its survival,” said
Alessio Patalano, a Japanese naval expert at King’s College London. “Japanese
maritime capabilities are therefore designed to allow Japan to retain
regular access to sea lanes.”
“China ’s
assertiveness at sea is, at this stage, a potential concern for Japan primarily
in relation to the archipelago’s territorial integrity,” he said.
Accordingly, Japan
is spending ¥ 70.1 billion (US $720 million) this year to build one of a new
class of 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyers, the DD class, which has improved
submarine detection capability. The purpose is “to respond to higher
performance and silence of submarines of other countries,” according to the
MoD’s budget explanation, a veiled reference to China’s new, more stealthy Type
93 submarine.
Pressure from China
is pushing Japan
in two ways, Patalano said.
“One is geographical, with greater emphasis on the defense of the
southwestern part of the archipelago; and the second is in approach, with
greater emphasis given to conventional deterrence, particularly in the form of
more regular presence and enhanced ISR,” he said.
One example is maintaining Japan ’s destroyers. With its budget
constrained over the decade, the MoD has pushed to extend the life of 14 ships
of four different classes. according to MoD documents.
In addition, the Maritime Self-Defense Force is spending ¥ 53.1 billion
yen this year building a new SS-class submarine, but also investing to extend
the life of its submarine fleet and increase it numbers from 16 to 22.
“This is one of the most important assets in the Japanese fleet, for
they offer a significant source for ISR in patrol missions, but also a powerful
stealth asset for conventional deterrence, or if necessary, a significant punch
to the fleet,” Patalano said.
Much attention has been focused on the four Hyuga-class helicopter
destroyers, comprising two 13,500-ton ships that Japan has deployed, and now
the two 19,500-ton (empty) and 27,000-ton (full load) helicopter destroyer
(DDH) class of helicopter carriers under construction.
Speculation surrounds the strategic purpose of the ships, primarily
whether they can be converted to accommodate the F-35B short-takeoff and
vertical-landing aircraft.
James Manicom, research fellow
in Global Security at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in
Waterloo, Canada, said the putative aircraft carriers are only what the MoD
says they are — an important new ASW capability against the People’s Liberation
Army Navy.
“I’m not convinced that the debate in Japan has gotten to the point that
people are seriously considering projecting air power in such a fashion,”
Manicom said.
ASEAN: Varied Motives for Buying
ASEAN is divided into two threat perception groups: mainland states (Cambodia , Laos ,
Myanmar and Thailand ) and
maritime states. The latter includes nations that are involved in territorial
disputes — the Philippines , Vietnam , Malaysia
and Brunei and those that
are not — Indonesia and Singapore .
Most of these ASEAN groups are expanding their naval procurements but
for different reasons, Nugent said.
The Philippines and Vietnam , for
instance, have experienced harassment and ramming of their naval and maritime
patrol vessels by Chinese vessels.
In 2011, in response to aggressive Chinese behavior in the South China
Sea, Manila authorized a new defense strategy,
said Carl Thayer, a regional maritime specialist at the Australian Defence
Force Academy .
Philippine President Benigno Aquino earmarked $60 million for a new
naval patrol vessel and six helicopters to secure the Malampaya oil and gas
project. Then in 2012, Manila
implemented a five-year, $900 million modernization program and announced the
procurement of a refurbished frigate, C-130 aircraft and utility/combat
helicopters.
Thayer said Vietnam ’s
defense budget for 2012 was $3.3 billion, an increase of 150 percent from 2008
to 2011, and the naval budget alone was expected to hit $400 million by 2015. In
2009, Hanoi
announced it would procure six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, scheduled
for delivery in 2014.
In 2011, Thayer said,
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