In a speech on February 7
highlighting steadily escalating Anglo-Argentine tensions, the explosive issue
of the Falkland Islands was the focus. Argentine
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner announced that her government was
prepared to denounce London ’s “latest
re-militarization of the South Atlantic ”
before the UN’s General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Committee on
Decolonization.
Reaching a Boiling Point
The increased “militarization” that President Kirchner was condemning
refers to
Not surprisingly, in her speech,
President Cristina Kirchner failed to mention the increasingly aggressive
tactics that her own government (and that of her husband before her) has
pursued against Britain ’s
claim to the Falklands in these last two
administrations. Last September, President Kirchner formally raised the Falklands issue before the UN General Assembly. At the
time she threatened to suspend certain bilateral agreements affecting Britain , such as biweekly air travel to the
archipelago from Chile , if Britain refused to enter into talks about the Falkland Islands ’ future. Additionally, on December
5, Argentina launched a series of maritime exercises to isolate the Falklands,
detaining various forms of fishing craft that it interpreted as capable of
“breaking the blockade” around the islands. On January 11, Argentina
started a “squid war” against the archipelago, urging Argentine fishermen to
catch the squid before it reached the British beaches.
Since late January, Argentina has
been able to routinely secure a vote of confidence from fellow members of ALBA
and MERCOSUR, with these Latin American states supporting its bid to claim
sovereignty over the islands. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez even went as far
as to give support for Argentina
in the unlikely event of a military standoff. Though this was largely a
symbolic gesture, (ships flying the British flag would still be allowed to
enter these ports) it struck a considerable symbolic blow to Anglo-Argentine
relations. All of this culminated in last week’s speech, when President
Kirchner pledged to a room full of politicians and Falklands War veterans that
she would take her case against Britain
to the United Nations. Throughout all of this, the crux of London ’s stance—that the Islanders’ desires
should be protected above all else—has remained unaltered.
Domestic Roots of the Tense
Anglo-Argentine Relationship
The tense foreign policy stances of
these two nations reflect escalating domestic troubles in both countries. Ironically,
the bellicose attitude of both protagonists comes at a time when their military
preparedness is greatly diminished in real terms. The British Defense Ministry
is scheduled to be particularly hard hit this year by further budget cuts (two
percent cuts were announced in 2011). When Prime Minister David Cameron
organized a National Security Committee in January in order to review the
diplomatic strategy affecting the Falklands
region, the issue of securing the archipelago amidst cuts in military
appropriations, particularly regarding the Royal Navy, was of prime concern.
Many critics of Cristina’s
unalterable stance on the Falklands argue that
her position is really just a way to deflect attention from the country’s
growing domestic woes. Speculation surrounding the nature of the Falklands / Malvinas conflict has intensified in the
intervening years and has been full of subtle revelations suggesting that the
conflict has become a massive distraction meant to becloud the Argentine
public. It can be seen as an effort to keep foreign observers from peering too
closely into allegations of corruption, executive ineffectiveness, and
out-of-control inflation. While Argentina
recently showed one of the highest GDP growth rates in the entire region, it
has also faced criticism by the IMF for the quality of its INDEC inflation
figures (which are uncomfortably high). The fact that the country’s financial
papers remain locked into a low investment grade status is further cause for
concern, according to critics. Due to gross public spending, austerity measures
are gradually being enforced on a provincial level, making the prospect of
rising social tensions palpable.
Although she was widely popular
after initiating her presidency in slow gear, and flanked at first by
considerable carping, President Kirchner’s warm public reception is beginning
to cool. Unemployment is rapidly climbing; inflation could be as high as 25%,
and the accuracy of official statistics are being chronically challenged. The
government could be in for a long siege where a distraction like that of the Falklands could prove increasingly welcomed. According
to a poll by Ibarometro,
seventy percent of Argentines that were surveyed consider the bid to reclaim
the Falklands important, though only thirty
percent would want the country to go to war. Britain
would also be hard-pressed in winning over support for a war against Argentina , especially after the country’s
protracted and costly experience in Iraq .
Is it all about Oil?
Of course, neither Argentina nor Britain might not be so concerned about control of the Falklands if there were not so many natural resources to be extracted in the region, particularly that of oil. Though in the early nineties there was talk of a bilateral oil mining co-dominion betweenBritain and Argentina , with the ascension of
the Kirchners to power, any collaborative talk was muted. The British
Geological Survey reported that there are substantial off shore oil reserves
that could procure 500,000 barrels per day. Three prominent oil-exploring firms
have been prospecting on the ocean floor surrounding the islands: Borders and
Southern Petroleum Plc, Rockhopper & Desire Petroleum. The potential
rewards for investment in offshore drilling have been compared to the 2007
offshore Jubilee field discovery in Ghana , which turned that country
into one of the top fifty oil states in the world. Morgan Stanley has ranked
the Falklands region, which could potentially
contain 8.3 billion barrels of oil, as one of the top fifteen offshore
prospects of 2012, though later estimates have tempered these high
expectations. Despite some continued claims of lucrative possibilities, larger
oil companies so far tread a fine line, making certain that they do not get
involved in the political dispute at hand, thus stalling any momentum forward
as talks are carried on behind the scenes.
Of course, neither Argentina nor Britain might not be so concerned about control of the Falklands if there were not so many natural resources to be extracted in the region, particularly that of oil. Though in the early nineties there was talk of a bilateral oil mining co-dominion between
The Rattenbach Report
A tantalizing side bar to the 1982 legacy of the Argentine-UK altercation will be furnished when the still confidential Rattenbach report is entirely declassified.
A tantalizing side bar to the 1982 legacy of the Argentine-UK altercation will be furnished when the still confidential Rattenbach report is entirely declassified.
After its defeat in the Falklands
war and before turning over the authority to civilian rule, Argentina ’s military government assigned Colonel
Benjamin Rattenbach with the task of preparing the aforementioned report,
leading an internal investigation team to examine the main mistakes and
setbacks that lead to Argentina ’s
ultimate defeat.
According to an informal version of
the report published by the Argentine magazine “Siete Días,” its findings mention
that “there was a lack of application of the joint training doctrine.” Instead
of having an interest in a unified Air
Force , Argentina ’s
Navy also retained control of a semi-private Air Force Battalion which, as a
result, impaired the effectiveness of their attacks on the British Navy’s unit.
The report claimed, among other things, that pilots had not been trained to
fire against moving targets in the ocean. In other words, the Argentine
offensive approach against the British was improvised. Although others praised Argentina ’s
military strikes, the report indicated that sixty percent of the bombs dropped
on the British ships failed to explode.
Besides pointing a searchlight at
all corners of some of the more controversial aspects of the decisions being
made by the Argentine military Junta, the report also contains key information
on the conflict regarding the germane international framework at the time. Now
with the declassification of the report, Cristina Kirchner is likely to seek
evidence that will strengthen her arguments regarding the formal claims filed
before the U.N. against Britain .
Unfortunately, the ground rules
dictate that the full report will not be disclosed. A commission was assigned
to analyze the document in thirty days (starting from February 7, 2012) and
only parts that are of interest to Argentina ’s security requirements
will be formally published. This is because the reports—if useful—could
tabulate a skein of acts of skullduggery on the part of the Argentine military
junta of the late 1970s.
Problematic U.S. Role in 1982 Argentine Invasion: Answers
Are Needed
There are still a number of issues regardingWashington ’s
attitude towards the Argentine attack against the Falklands
in 1982 that need amplification and clarification. The Reagan Administration
may have played a considerably larger and more sinister role in the detonation
of the Falklands war than previously
acknowledged, and it may have provided considerable comfort to the Argentine
side. While there is no question that President Reagan nursed a distinct
pro-British bias, the same was not necessarily true of some of his servitors. The
question is how much the ambassador to the United Nations at the time, Jeanne
Kirkpatrick, knew about the impending military action. The same can be asked of
General Vernon Walters who was in Argentina
as part of a tour of Latin America to rebuild links with right-wing military
regimes in the region, to which Washington
was distinctly partial. Walter was visiting senior Argentine military officials
in Buenos Aires at the time that Argentine
attack against the Falklands was being
launched. The then commander of the Argentine Navy, Emilio Massera later told
COHA director Larry Birns that Walters was informed about the Argentine
military’s impending attack in a gathering at a military club and merely
shrugged his shoulders.
There are still a number of issues regarding
The assembled senior military
officers meeting in Buenos Aires interpreted the
gesture by Argentine officials in the room as one of consent by the U.S. , for the attack and a similar conclusion
was drawn by Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who was at the Argentine embassy in Washington for a dinner
that very same evening. Circumstantial evidence indirectly shows that the
Argentines present that evening could reasonably have concluded that their
country’s action against the British came as no great surprise to the Pentagon.
The presence of General Walters at the dinner renders this information nearly
undeniable. This was particularly the case since General Walters and Ambassador
Kirkpatrick were among the most influential and ranking figures in the
administration as well as among the most conservative and those most
sympathetic to the military Junta.
Conclusion
Despite these highly publicized developments, one reality remains clear:
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