For the past few years, India and Bangladesh have been enjoying a
renascent friendly relationship based on shared interests and
reciprocity. Under this rubric, they have been able to resolve various
contentious issues as well as show a willingness to cooperate with each
other for mutual benefit. Bangladesh addressed India’s security concerns
by handing over a number of top Northeast insurgent leaders to India.
For its part, India has reciprocated by: settling the decades-old border
dispute; facilitating the provision of electricity to Dahagram and
Angarpota and providing 24 hour access to these two Bangladeshi enclaves
through the Teen Bigha; allowing duty free access to 10 million pieces
of readymade garments from Bangladesh and removing 46 textile items from
the negative list; providing Nepal and Bhutan transit access to
Bangladesh, and promising to invest in Bangladesh’s infrastructure
sector; and, 225 Indian firms promising to invest Rs. 558.77 million as
FDI in Bangladesh.
Despite all this, anti-India sentiments continue to grow in
Bangladesh and have now come to centre primarily on two issues: India’s
failure to finalise an agreement on sharing the waters of the Teesta and
its decision to go ahead with the construction of the Tipaimukh dam.
Under the 1983 Teesta river water agreement, presently, India and
Bangladesh share 75 per cent of the river’s waters on a 39 and 36 per
cent basis, respectively. As a friendly gesture, India had reportedly
decided to share the remaining 25 per cent water with Bangladesh on a
50:50 basis. Domestic political compulsions, however, compelled India to
pull back from signing the agreement at the last minute during Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to Bangladesh. This volte face by
India not only embarrassed the Sheikh Hasina government but has also
tarnished India’s image as a reliable partner. The people of Bangladesh
perceive it as a betrayal of trust as they hoped that the signing of
such an agreement would settle the issue of water shortage in northern
Bangladesh and serve as a template for the future sharing of
trans-boundary water resources between the two countries
At the
same time, the proposed construction of the Tipaimukh dam near the
confluence of the Barak and Tuivai rivers in India has become yet
another spoiler in the bilateral relationship. Bangladesh fears that the
construction of the dam would greatly reduce the flow of the Barak
river in Bangladesh as well as adversely affect its two downstream
channels – Kushiyara and Surma. Reduced water flow, according to
Bangladeshi experts, would wreak havoc on the ecology, turn northeast
Bangladesh into a desert and destroy the livelihoods of thousands of
people. India had been trying to allay these fears by arguing that the
Tipaimukh multipurpose hydroelectric project would in fact help in flood
moderation, improve river navigation and aid the fisheries sector in
Bangladesh. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh even promised that India would
not do anything that would harm the interest of Bangladesh. However,
the signing of a ‘promoter’s agreement’ between the Government of
Manipur, the National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) and the Sutlej Jal
Vidyut Nigam (SJVN) on October 22, 2011 to set up a joint venture
company has raised hackles in Bangladesh. Many in Bangladesh are
interpreting it as yet another example of India breaking its promise.
Some in Bangladesh even claim that India has indeed built the dam,
whereas in reality no such dam exists on the proposed site.
Nevertheless, rumour mongering has succeeded in spreading misinformation
and fomenting anti-India sentiments.
In addition to these two
issues, the killings of supposedly innocent cattle traders and other
Bangladeshi citizens by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) along the
border continue to strain the bilateral relationship. Last year, India
had agreed to use non-lethal weapons against trespassers in an attempt
to bring down the number of such killings. The BSF has claimed that the
number of border killings has reduced substantially because of the use
of non-lethal weapons and that the ‘innocent cattle traders’ who get
killed are in fact gangs of cattle smugglers who attack Indian border
guards. Bangladesh, however, asserts that frequent killings along the
border indicate that India has gone back on its promise of preventing
its border guards from killing Bangladeshi civilians.
Related to
the issue of border killings is the smuggling of phensedyl into
Bangladesh. Bangladesh argues that its drug problem arises from the
channelling of spurious phensedyl manufactured in factories set up
inside Indian territory along the border. Refuting these charges, India
maintains that it cannot take action against the distribution of a legal
drug in its territory. The discrepancies between the two countries in
their understanding of the situation arise from differing notions about
what is legal and what is not. While the trade in cows is legal in
Bangladesh, it is illegal in India and therefore has to be prevented at
any cost. In contrast, phensedyl is banned in Bangladesh but is a legal
drug in India and therefore can be sold anywhere in the country.
The
main casualty in this atmosphere of growing frustration has been the
transit issue, which, if implemented, would benefit both countries.
India would save time and money in transporting goods to its
Northeastern states, while Bangladesh would be able to earn millions of
dollars in transit fees. The provision of transit rights to India has
always been a contentious issue in Bangladesh. People opposed to this
measure argue that it would allow India to transport lethal weapons to
its Northeastern states through Bangladeshi territory; that it would
ruin Bangladeshi exports to the markets of India’s Northeast; and, that
it would lead to the spread of drugs and HIV within Bangladesh. Protests
have also taken place in Bangladesh against the trial runs for the
trans-shipment of ODC (Over Dimensional Cargos) through the Ashuganj
port. Nevertheless, the Bangladesh government successfully overcame all
opposition and had agreed in principle to provide transit facilities to
India. The two countries were set to sign an agreement to this effect in
September 2011. However, India’s turnaround on the Teesta agreement
prompted Bangladesh to hold back on the transit issue.
Such
stalemates and the creeping feeling in Bangladesh that it has done more
for India without gaining anything substantial in return does not bode
well for the relationship. India must act swiftly to stem the downslide
in its relationship with Bangladesh. While it is a fact that the
amicable resolution of various vexing issues and pronouncements about
huge investments (which have raised considerable hopes in Bangladesh)
would take time to implement, it is also true that India has failed to
live up to its commitments and needs to get its act together.
To
begin with, India should expedite the conclusion of the Teesta
agreement. Secondly, it should invite an all-party delegation from
Bangladesh to the proposed Tipaimukh dam site and request Bangladeshi
participation in the joint construction of the multipurpose project in
order to encourage transparency and dispel misgivings. India should
insist on the speedy implementation of the joint coordinated border
patrol plan, which would secure the border against smugglers and help
reduce unnecessary killings. India should also take steps to regulate
the distribution mechanism of phensedyl within its territory and take
stringent action against drugs stockists, especially in the border
towns. India should address the Sheikh Hasina government’s refrain that
it does not have much time on its side by implementing all agreements in
a time bound manner as well as fast tracking various trans-border
infrastructural developmental schemes. Most importantly, India should
address the interests of the common people of Bangladesh and keep its
promises.
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