Countering AQ Ambitions in Libya

Pundits seem to be overwhelming for or fanatically against all actions. I see no point in arguing over whether the U.S. should have initiated a No Fly Zone (NFZ) in support of the Libyan opposition.  It’s over, and the West should now concentrate on its interests; one of them being the denial of an AQ safe haven in Eastern Libya.
Hopefully, I’ve been a little more measured in the past three posts and I’ll try to outline some reasonable policy and military actions the West can take now to thwart what few AQ-LIFG-Rebel Opposition linkages there are in Libya.

1. End the Gaddafi regime immediately- Opposition to Gaddafi links rebels generally amenable to the West with jihadi’s affiliated with LIFG-AQ types.  The longer LIFG-AQ types remain embedded with other Libyan opposition groups, the stronger the bonds will be between them.  Eliminating the Gaddafi regime will allow for more moderate rebel groups to emerge and repel AQ aggression.
2. Push moderate rebel leaders to the forefront- The West should move to place a face on the Libyan opposition.  Strategic communications should be implemented quickly to demonstrate to the world that the Libyan opposition is clearly not the result of AQ inspiration.  This could be accomplished through publicized communication with select opposition leaders and widely broadcast television interviews with key rebel partners allied against Gaddafi and LIFG-AQ linked groups. Current amorphous descriptions of the Libyan opposition create ambiguity allowing for biased interpretation; ambiguity easily capitalized on by AQ elements taking credit for a revolution they missed.
3. Don’t waste an opportunity- The U.S. wanted to counter jihadi elements in Darnah three years ago. The NFZ and the vacuum created by the crumbling Gaddafi regime should not be wasted.  If AQ moves to bolster their position in Libya, the West should be prepared early to use soft and hard power options directly and through surrogates.
4. Isolate Darnah if necessary- LIFG-AQ support and presence in Darnah has existed for a long time.  The West should move aggressively to monitor and isolate Darnah if it goes the way of AQ.  Own the border crossing from Egypt. Monitor desert crossings with aerial surveillance. Control the coast through the Navy.  Darnah is one of the few places AQ might reside where the West retains distinct capabilities to monitor the region from land, sea and air.
5. Engage the EU reference an AQ Libyan safe haven- Should AQ gain a safe haven in Libya, the greatest threat will initially be to Europe.  The U.S. has proceeded responsibly by letting NATO take the reins of the NFZ.  EU countries need to step up in the CT effort in Libya.  Italy, France and the UK all have reason to get engaged.
6. Prepare for something other than democracy in Libya-  I hope lessons learned from trying to institute democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan reasonably moderate the West’s vision of Libya’s political future.  Freedom comes in many forms and often time incrementally.  Libya remains a tribal, oil dependent country.  Constructing a unified democracy without occupation is likely impossible.  Libya may find renewed political stability and economic vitality quicker if it pursued an emirate type structure; a form closer to the original Barbary states or similar to the UAE.  Can the West accept this?  Can they help this happen?  This will be tough.  Bottom line: a weak democracy is more beneficial to AQ while stronger sub-states can be a useful counter against AQ aggression.