Ozymandias in Egypt

Even as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak orders his government to resign, well-informed experts are concluding that the course of events in Egypt is not likely to result in a revolution. They argue that Egypt's military controls the country and understands that a revolution generally isn't good for business.
In the words of Brookings Institution expert Ken Pollack, "The history of revolutions is that they only succeed when the government loses the will or the capability to use violence and so far there is nothing that is happening in Egypt that suggests that either one is going to happen."

From this perspective, it doesn't matter that Egypt's government, like that of Iran under the Shah, faces resurgent Islamic fundamentalism attacking a government seen as corrupt and overly close to heretic governments in the west. It's insufficient that the government is unpopular, perpetuating and exploiting gross income inequality, and for ordinary Egyptians, funadamentally unjust. So long as the local military doesn't lose its will to retain power, the center will hold.
By this calculus, the Iranian Revolution was only possible because the Shah left town on January 16, 1979 after being unwilling to be sufficiently ruthless in using his secret police, the SAVAK, to crack enough heads.
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The State Department is telegraphing in every statement its view that such hope as Hosni Mubarak has for maintaining control will come through finding mechanisms, even at this late date, for reform, rather than through a military lock-down. Rather than being naive, this is probably the best hope that Egypt has.
Other revolutions suggest that there comes a time when repression, rather than suppressing revolution, fans it. Certainly, the Czar's regime did not become less repressive under Nicholas II than it had been under his father. Instead, the Czar became blamed after soldiers fired on unarmed protestors in 1905. While it took the regime another 12 years to fall, when it did, those participating in the revolution included ordinary sailors and soldiers who had simply had enough of life under the Czar. Their actions were in turn fanned, shaped, and ultimately taken over, by the ideologically clear Bolsheviks.
A similar process took place in the Iranian revolution. In December 1978, some 17 million people marched peacefully to demand that the Shah resign and the Ayatollah Khomeini return from his exile in France. Their actions were shaped by the fundamentalists, and stimulated by them, but not yet controlled by them. One month later, the Shah left and the Ayatollah returned. One month after that, the Ayatollah called for the Shah's arrest and trial, and a process of systematic radicalization controlled by the religious (and political) fundamentalists began that has culminated in the discrete charm of Ahmadinejad's unique brand of populist theocratic authoritarianism. The similarities between the course of the Russian and the Iranian revolutions, separated by more than six decades, and powered by vastly different ideologies, remain profound.
It's hard to see a tipping point until after the weight has shifted.
In Eastern Europe, the rainbow colored revolutions generally did succeed after Soviet governments lost the will to fight. Militaries did not play profound roles in those revolutions -- Germany, Poland, Romania, even Russia -- once the political will at the top to oppose the change had been lost.
Even the relatively bloody revolution last spring in Kygryzstan predominently involved political changes, initiated by elites but assisted by broad popular support, rather than by determination of who would be in charge by the military.
Tunisia's revolution, too, was driven by a popular movement, without the military playing a fundamental role pro- or con-. Just 21 people died in the Jasmine Revolution, suggesting that the military ultimately chose not to weigh in as it might have as Ben Ali's government's fate was determined by the broader Tunisian public.
Can a gigantic, well-funded miitary with an almost complete monopoly of force in a country overpower a popular revolution demanding change? Perhaps. Certainly, the Islamic government in Iran continues to demonstrate its power and authority, showing its utter willingness to kill street protestors after the disputed 2009 elections.
But that government retains true believers. How many true believers remain in Iran may be subject to dispute -- but is there still some popular support for Amadinejad and his government? By all appearances -- yes.
Mubarak's government, by contrast, is a government of the army, not a government backed by any ideology. Pharaohs and Caesars, look indomitable, with the frown, the wrinked lip, and the sneer of cold command, until suddenly, one day, they don't.
Revolutions bring huge risks, as short-term instabilities can evolve into deeply anti-democratic, corrupt, and dangerous regimes. A transition in Egypt that avoids a fundamentalist takeover while providing the development of a more just civil, political, and economic order, would be very good news indeed.
The State Department is right to hope that it will go that way. But Egyptians, not outsiders, will determine the course of the next stage of their history from here.